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ABSTRACT 
 
Peer-to-peer file-sharing service providers (P2Ps) allow 
Internet users to exchange electronic content, including 
music, movies, and other digital works. In Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court 
unanimously disarmed such P2Ps by holding that it is 
unlawful to distribute programs that induce others to commit 
copyright infringement. Evolved technologies, such as dot-
torrent, allow mass file exchanges between third-party users--
an attempt to remove the P2P from the file-sharing equation. 
 The court in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 
however, imputed inducement from the search and index 
functionality of the P2P’s software, as well as the P2P’s 
encouraging behavior.  The court in Arista Records LLC v. 
Lime Group LLC determined that LimeWire’s entire business 
model was founded on inducement.  In both Fung and Lime 
Group, the P2P's intent was deduced from its outward acts. 
 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare, the court noted that 
RapidShare did not provide search and indexing capability 
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and actively policed its servers when notified of infringement. 
This technological-behavioral standard of inducement 
suggests that P2Ps cannot avoid secondary liability under the 
guise of removing themselves as the “head” of the file-
sharing process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As technology evolves, the music and movie industries confront 
new challenges to the enforcement of their copyrights. The collision 
of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing technologies and the copyright 
industry was first highlighted by the downfall of the Napster music 
sharing platform.1 Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court developed a 
standard for P2P secondary liability based on intent, as evidenced by 
outward acts or statements.2 This standard did not target P2P 
                                                                                                             
1  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 
2001) (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding Napster liable for contributory copyright 
infringement as “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, 
causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another”)).  
2  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 
(2005) (holding that anyone who distributes a “device with the object of promoting 
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technologies as pure technology, but considered how they were 
actually used and were intended to be used, as well as whether the 
P2P specifically promoted and encouraged infringement. Three recent 
district court file-sharing cases emphasize the importance of search 
and index functionality as a means of facilitating infringement in 
determining secondary liability for copyright infringement. These 
decisions evaluate search capability and indexing of popular 
copyrighted material under the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster3 line of cases. In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. 
Fung,4 the court termed the defendants’ dot-torrent file technology 
“nothing more than old wine in a new bottle” that induced 
infringement on a massive scale.5 In Arista Records LLC v. Lime 
Group LLC,6 the court noted how defendant LimeWire fostered 
infringement through search and index capability and did not 
“implement any meaningful infringement-reduction strategies.”7  
The court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare A.G.,8 on the other 
hand, observed that RapidShare’s online storage locations neither 
indexed uploaded files nor allowed users to search for files.9 
Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not provided 
evidence that RapidShare's system was designed, disseminated, or 
promoted expressly for purposes of facilitating infringement. Despite 
its directly housing the potentially infringing files, RapidShare was 
not secondarily liable for infringement.10 From a technological 
standpoint, search and indexing functionality unites these three 
decisions. When a P2P has actively and intentionally encouraged its 
                                                                                                             
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties”). 
3  Id.  
4  Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 
21, 2009).  
5  Id. at *19.  
6  Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011 WL 1742029 (S.D.N.Y. May 
2, 2011). 
7  Id. at *21. 
8  Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare A.G., No. 09-CV-2596 H (S.D. Cal. May 18, 
2010), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/39107375/Perfect-10-v-
Rapidshare---order-denying-preliminary-injunction-0100518. 
9  Id. at *11. 
10 Id. 
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users to upload, find, and aggregate copyrighted material, courts have 
found secondary liability under a theory of inducement. Fung and 
Lime Group demonstrate that P2Ps cannot avoid secondary liability 
by distancing themselves from the infringing activity simply through 
the use of technology that decentralizes the infringing file transfers 
and even the indexing thereof.11  
To date, courts have found inducement liability when specifically 
examining P2P services, rather than services that host content or 
other services that fall under the umbrella category of “service 
providers”12 as defined in subsection 512(k)(1)(B) of the DMCA. 
Indeed, a number of other service providers have found shelter under 
the safe harbor provisions13 of the DMCA.14 Policy concerns, as well 
                                                                                                             
11 See also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that “willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law (where indeed it may 
be enough that the defendant should have known of the direct infringement). . . .”) 
(citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); 2 Paul Goldstein, 
Copyright § 6.1 p. 6:6 (2d ed. 2003)). Evolved technologies cannot insulate a 
service provider from potential contributory liability where the service provider 
looks the other way.  
12 The term “service provider” under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A), (B) (2006) is defined as:  
(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity 
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online 
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the 
user's choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received. 
(B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service 
provider” means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of 
facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph (A). 
13 17 U.S.C. § 512 §§(a)-(d) (2006) establishes four categories of safe harbors 
to “‘provide protection from liability for: (1) transitory digital network 
communications; (2) system caching; (3) information residing on systems or 
networks at the direction of users; and (4) information location tools.’” Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ellison v. 
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)). To qualify for any of the four safe 
harbors, a service provider must meet the requirements of the applicable subsection 
as well as those of § 512(i), including whether the service provider “has adopted 
and reasonably implemented . . . a policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service 
provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.” CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109.  
14 Many recent cases have found in favor of defendant service providers under 
various safe harbor provisions. These cases do not, however, appear to involve 
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as which particular court was hearing the case, have likely 
contributed to the outcome of these cases.15  
Following a survey of file-sharing technologies generally and an 
overview of inducement liability, this Article examines the role that 
search and index functionality and the P2P's conduct have played in 
Fung, Lime Group, and RapidShare. Combined, these cases suggest 
that a mutually reinforcing technological-behavioral standard has 
emerged for P2Ps, whereby search and indexing capacity, among 
other technologies, can be imputed as evidence of behavioral intent to 
promote infringement. Moreover, this standard appears to be different 
than that which courts apply to other service providers.16  
                                                                                                             
analogous peer-to-peer file-sharing service providers with search and indexing 
capabilities. Several cases focus on the notification provisions of the DMCA for 
removal of content and the reasonable implementation of a policy for terminating 
the accounts of repeat infringers under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(a). See CCBill, 488 
F.3d at 1109. Other courts have explicitly found safe harbor protection for 
defendant service providers, primarily under § 512(c). See, e.g., Wolk v. Kodak 
Imaging Network, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27541, at *5-8, *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
17, 2011) (finding that Photobucket had a reasonable policy for removing repeat 
infringers under § 512(i)(1)(a) and that Photobucket met the safe harbor provisions 
of § 512(c), resulting in a denial of plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75071, at *22, *26, *29 
(C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (finding that Google’s treatment of Perfect 10’s “Group 
A” and “Group C” infringement notices met the requirements of the safe harbor 
under § 512(d) for Google’s Web and Image Search, warranting summary 
judgment, but finding that the adequacy Google’s processing of Perfect 10’s 
“Group B” notices was in dispute, precluding summary judgment); Viacom Int'l, 
Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting 
summary judgment for YouTube, which qualified for protection under § 512(c)); 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1118 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment for Veoh under § 512(c) safe harbor 
protection); Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145, 
1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (granting summary judgment for Veoh under § 512(c) safe 
harbor protection).   
15 The UMG v. Veoh and Viacom v. YouTube cases are both on appeal in the 
Ninth and Second Circuits, respectively.  
16 See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26 (observing that “[Grokster] and its 
progeny . . . have little application here. Grokster, Fung, and Lime Group involved 
peer-to-peer file-sharing networks which are not covered by the safe harbor 
provisions of § 512(c) of the DMCA. The Grokster and Lime Group opinions do 
not even mention the DMCA. Fung was an admitted copyright thief whose DMCA 
defense under § 512(d) was denied on undisputed evidence of ‘purposeful, culpable 
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I. FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP: NAPSTER, GROKSTER  
& TORRENT 
 
Peer-to-peer networks are decentralized systems that allow third-
party users to access files stored on other users’ systems. These 
systems do not store files in a central location.17 Napster, one of the 
original file-sharing programs, provided a “‘search index’ that served 
as [its] collective directory for the files available on the [Napster] 
server at any given time.”18 Individual users could access files from 
other Napster users, many of which contained pirated material subject 
to copyright. The Napster court noted how the software allowed 
third-party users to locate copyrighted .mp3 files through this search 
function and a “hotlist” function.19 Similar to other peer-to-peer 
networks, “the actual files shared never passed through or resided on 
the Napster servers.”20 The files located in third-party “libraries,” 
however, were indexed by the Napster software.21  
Post-Napster, technology evolved so that third-party users could 
search for files but the service provider did not affirmatively organize 
the files: “[u]nlike Napster, there was no central indexing of available 
files. Instead, an individual scanning through the Grokster software 
would enter a search term and the software itself, through use of a 
supernode—or indexing computer—would contact other computers 
seeking matching files.”22 The supernode computer would send the 
relevant information for the queried file, such as an IP address where 
                                                                                                             
expression and conduct’ aimed at promoting infringing uses of the [W]eb sites” 
(citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *56 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 21, 2009)). 
17 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920 
(2005). 
18 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1011-13 (9th Cir. 2001). 
19 Id. at 1012. The “hotlist” feature allowed Napster users to track other users’ 
names from whom they had previously downloaded files. When those “hotlisted” 
users logged onto the Napster system, their file libraries were immediately available 
for viewing. Again, the .mp3 files themselves were not stored on the Napster 
system.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
Dec. 21, 2009) (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 921). 
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the file was located, back to the requesting user.23 The process 
distanced the P2P from third-party infringement, as the “searching 
user would then download directly from the relevant computer” and 
the transfer would be complete between the two third-party users.24 A 
further variant of this technology involves no supernodes, but 
“[i]nstead, the peer computers communicate directly with each other 
through the network and requests go directly to other connected 
users.”25  
The goal of these new technologies is clear: make the P2P less of 
an “engine” and more of a “station,” thereby shifting responsibility 
for infringement to third-parties who travel through the station, 
instead of the P2P leading them to infringement. The Bit-Torrent26 
technology further distanced the P2P from the peer-to-peer file 
sharing process by employing Internet portals that accessed dot-
torrent files, not the actual files for the copyrighted materials. Bit-
Torrent is similar to prior peer-to-peer file sharing technologies in 
that the files reside on third-party user computers,27 but it differs in 
that the user first accesses a dot-torrent file—generally through a 
third-party website—and then can use those dot-torrent files to 
download content from multiple other users’ computers.28 Torrent 
networks have a unique larger-scale download process that involves 
downloading small bits of files from multiple users to assemble a 
complete file.29 Unlike previous peer-to-peer networks, the torrent 
process “enables users to identify, locate, and download a copy of the 
actual content item referenced by the dot-torrent file.”30 Though the 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 922). 
26 The files are “referred to as ‘dot-torrent’ files in reference to their file 
extension name. The dot-torrent files do not contain the actual content item 
searched for; rather, the dot-torrent file contains the data used by the Bit-Torrent 
client to retrieve the content through a peer-to-peer transfer.” Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009). The Fung 
case also uses the term “bit” to refer to the torrent files or the software client that 
manages the uploading and downloading of the torrent files.  
27 Id. at *1 
28 Id. at *1-2. 
29 Id. at *2.  
30 Id. at *3. 
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dot-torrent files are accessible through [third-party] websites, a P2P 
necessarily still creates and distributes the software that facilitates the 
file transfer process.31 
Standing alone, a torrent client application does not possess the 
ability to search other computers for files, because users must “visit a 
torrent site for the purpose of locating dot-torrent files containing the 
content that they wish to download.”32 Because third-party user 
actions direct searches through third-party Web sites, the torrent 
technology was conceived as “headless,”33 in an effort by the 
software client providers to avoid direct involvement and liability in 
the file-sharing equation. But court decisions have continued to 
frustrate these efforts where the P2P's activities constitute unlawful 
inducement of third parties to commit copyright infringement. 
 
II. INDUCEMENT LIABILITY FOR FILE-SHARING COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT 
 
Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary 
liability34 with “roots in the tort-law concepts of enterprise liability 
and imputed intent.”35 Napster was liable to the extent that it had 
reasonable knowledge that infringing files were available on its 
system for download and, inter alia, failed to prevent the “viral 
distribution” of those copyrighted works.36 A party contributorily 
                                                                                                             
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 By using the term “headless,” I do not mean strictly the P2P’s “head” as the 
point from which a transmission emanates. Viewed more broadly, “head” refers to 
the P2P’s behavior and intent, including the relationship between the technology 
the P2P creates and any intent that can be imputed to the P2P from the creation of 
that technology. A theoretically “headless” P2P could not be secondarily liable for 
inducement under Grokster because there could be no intent.  
34 While not formally addressed in this Article, the umbrella of secondary 
liability also includes vicarious liability, an extended form of “master-servant” 
liability where the defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing 
activities and also has a direct financial interest in them. Nimmer observes how 
vicarious liability originated “in the context of landlords of premises where 
infringement takes place.” See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2] (2010).  
35 Perfect 10 v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2007).  
36 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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infringes when he (1) has knowledge of a third-party’s infringement 
and (2) induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct.”37 It is consequently unlawful to knowingly “engage[] in 
personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement.”38 As is 
true for any theory of secondary liability, the plaintiff must show 
direct infringement of copyrights by third parties.39  
The Supreme Court in Grokster articulated a standard for 
contributory liability for services that provide a technology or service 
that enables infringement, referred to as “inducement” liability.40 
Under Grokster, inducement to infringe looks at clear evidence of 
encouragement to infringe by the distributor of the product or 
service.41 Grokster sent “inducing messages”42 to its users, such as 
distributing an “electronic newsletter containing links to articles 
promoting its software's ability to access popular copyrighted music,” 
and expressly advertised to former Napster users.43 These messages 
were “evidence of the distributors’ words and deeds going beyond 
distribution as such[,] show[ing] a purpose to cause and profit from 
third-party acts of copyright infringement.”44 Inducement liability 
cannot be premised on the “mere knowledge of infringing potential or 
actual infringing. …The inducement rule, instead, premises liability 
                                                                                                             
Napster was decided on a “site and facilities” theory of contributory liability: 
Napster encouraged and materially contributed to direct infringement by providing 
the site and facilities for infringement, and indexing was one of the facilities it 
provided, indeed the primary one. Id. at 1022. 
37 Id. at 1019.   
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 1004, 1013 n. 2. 
40 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. The courts have created several theories of 
contributory copyright infringement, including the provision of a staple article of 
commerce that has no substantial non-infringing use per the Supreme Court's 
decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(holding that the manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder was not a 
contributory infringer). See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3] (2010). While courts often mislabel or blur the 
distinctions between vicarious and contributory infringement, or different strands of 
liability within contributory infringement, this Article focuses on the inducement 
prong of contributory liability.  
41 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936. 
42 Id. at 937. 
43 Id. at 925-26. 
44 Id. at 941. 
9
Rona: Off with the Head? How Eliminating Search and Index Functionality
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
36 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL7:1 
on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct. . . .”45 A P2P who 
distributes a device or software with the intent of promoting its use to 
foster infringement (and does so promote its use) may be liable under 
a theory of inducement.46  
 
III. SEARCH AND INDEXING FUNCTIONALITY 
 
P2P software distributors have been unable to eliminate 
inducement liability by further developing P2P filing-sharing 
technology to mask any direct involvement of the P2P provider in the 
infringing activities. Instead, courts continue to examine the P2P’s 
intention and the impact of the technology, rather than just the 
functional capabilities of the technology itself.47 Providing search and 
indexing functionality, however, does not doom a P2P if it can meet 
the requirements for a DMCA safe harbor, beginning with the basic 
premise that the P2P is not aware of the infringement.48  
Viewed together, the following three cases show that offering 
search and indexing capabilities exposes file-sharing services to 
liability when coupled with behavior indicating an intent to promote 
infringement. 
 
                                                                                                             
45 Id. at 936-37. 
46 See id.  
47 See Columbia Pictures v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 
21, 2009).  
48 One of the safe harbors for service providers enacted with the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d), provides a safe harbor affirmative 
defense to contributory liability resulting from third-party copyright infringement 
for “information location tools.” To immunize itself from secondary liability under 
the safe harbor, a service provider must satisfy three separate prongs (in addition to 
the general requirements under subsection 512(i) . The party “[1] does not know . . . 
or have reason to know . . . of infringing activities, or removes infringing materials 
upon receipt of such knowledge; and [2] does not profit from infringement where it 
has the power to control the infringement . . . ; and [3] upon receiving notice . . . 
from the copyright holder, removes the infringing material . . . .” Fung, 2009 WL 
6355911, at *16. This safe harbor for “information location tools” applies to 
“copyright infringement resulting from the use of information location tools by 
service providers, which include directories, indexes, references, pointers and 
hypertext links.” See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 
1146, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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A.  Columbia Pictures v. Fung: Intent to Induce 
 
Defendant Gary Fung operated several websites49 that allowed 
users to download copyrighted material through a torrent structure.50 
Users accessed movies, television shows, sound recordings, software 
programs, video games, and other content for free by connecting with 
other users offering these files.51 The Fung sites contained several 
features that organized the content for third-party users, including 
“Top Searches,” “Top 20 Movies,” and “Top 20 Most Downloaded 
Torrents.”52 Every file in the “Top Searches” category was 
copyrighted, and Plaintiffs’ expert further maintained that 95 percent 
of total downloads involved copyrighted material.53 Furthermore, 
Fung’s sites contained headers with the term “warez,”54 and actively 
promoted copyright infringement through slogans and commentary in 
discussion forums on his websites.55  
Through the lens of Grokster inducement liability, the court 
characterized Fung’s aggregation of infringing content into 
“browseable categories” containing “further information about the 
works contained in the [torrent] files” as “disseminated messages 
designed to stimulate inducement.”56 Fung maintained that his system 
was “headless,” entirely driven by third-party user activity.57  The 
court disagreed, noting that Fung actively created the framework for 
                                                                                                             
49 The Fung sites included: www.isohunt.com, www.torrentbox.com, 
www.podtropolis.com, and www.ed2k-it.com.  
50 The court explained that “Bit-Torrent technology relies on a variety of 
mechanisms in order to accomplish the ultimate downloading of a given file, 
including: (1) a software application that users download, which is commonly 
referred to as a ‘client application’; (2) websites, also known as ‘torrent sites,’ 
which allow users to select ‘dot-torrent’ files that they wish to download; and (3) 
servers, also known as ‘trackers,’ that manage the download process. The client 
applications and trackers work together through the use of ‘Bit-Torrent protocol’ 
which standardizes the client-client and client-tracker communications.” Columbia 
Pictures v. Fung, 2009 WL 6355911, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009).  
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 The term “warez” refers to pirated content. 
55 Id. at *5, *12.  
56 Id. at *11.  
57 Id. 
11
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the infringing activity by designing the websites, including “a feature 
that collects users’ most commonly searched-for titles[,] . . . and 
never remov[ing] these lists.” 58 Fung’s design was probative of his 
“knowledge of ongoing infringement and failure to prevent such 
infringement.”59 Posting messages in discussion forums that provided 
tips on how to search for certain copyrighted material, allowing 
“moderators” or “admins” to review the forums and assist third-party 
user queries, and commenting on third-party user aggregation lists of 
copyrighted works was indicative of an active role in encouraging 
infringement.60  
The court also noted that Fung employed “spider” programs 
(tracking software) that found and retrieved copies of dot-torrent 
files.61 Together, these factors—indexing material, allowing users to 
search, advertising content, commenting on content, and offering a 
“spider” to seek out files—meant Fung had merely “improved the 
functioning of his websites with respect to infringing uses.”62  
The Fung court construed search and index functionality, along 
with other contextual behavior mentioned above, as the inducing 
“message” that encouraged third-party infringement of copyrights. As 
such, Fung’s network was not a headless “proprietary” network that 
merely allowed users to download files from each other’s computers, 
but instead improved upon previous technologies to allow faster 
download of infringing materials.63 The court weighed the provision 
of search and index capacity as strong evidence of inducement, a 
factor which, along with other behavioral evidence, also had a 
significant impact on the courts' determination of inducement liability 
in the Lime Group and RapidShare cases.  
 
B.  Arista Records v. Lime Group: Intent to Induce 
 
LimeWire (“LW”) is a peer-to-peer file-sharing program that 
                                                                                                             
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at *12-13. 
61 Id. at *14.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at *19.  
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allows users to download and share digital files.64 Unlike the torrent 
technology in Fung, the LW software locates files on a single 
network where users can search for files on other computers.65 Once 
a file is located, the LW client transfers a digital copy from the source 
computer to the recipient’s computer.66 Several record companies 
sued LW for copyright infringement, arguing that LW users 
employed the software to obtain and share unauthorized copies of the 
companies’ sound recordings, and that LW facilitated this 
infringement by distributing and maintaining LW software.67  
In addition to the “inducing message” framework for secondary 
liability, Grokster also supplied other behavioral measures of proving 
intent to induce infringement.68 The Lime Group court divided these 
factors into five categories: (1) awareness of substantial infringement 
by users; (2) efforts to attract infringing users; (3) efforts to assist 
users to commit infringement; (4) dependence on infringing use for 
the success of its business; and (5) failure to mitigate infringing 
activities.69 Taken together, the court found “overwhelming 
evidence” that LW fostered infringement.70  
First, LW was aware of substantial infringement by LW users 
through LW’s effort to convert LW users who were sharing 
unauthorized digital music recordings into customers of LW’s online 
music store.71 LW’s “Conversion Plan” acknowledged that “(1) 25% 
of LW’s users were ‘hardcore pirates’; (2) 25% of users were 
‘morally persuadable’; (3) 20% of users were legally aware; and (4) 
30% of users were ‘samplers and convenience users.’”72 The 
Conversion Plan was supposed to introduce features that would block 
infringing uses and transition users to the online store, but those 
                                                                                                             
64 Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011 WL 1742029, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y.  May 2, 2011). 
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at *15 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913, 938-39 (2005)). 
69 Arista Records, 2011 WL 1742029 at *16.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at *17. 
72 Id.  
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features were never implemented.73 Numerous emails from LW 
users, as well as a collection of articles kept by LW employees 
entitled “Knowledge of Infringement” clearly established LW’s 
knowledge.74 
Second, LW made an effort to attract infringing users who 
formerly found files using the Napster software.75 LW contemplated 
using college campus advertising to leverage Napster’s ban and 
strategically placed LW website advertisements under certain Google 
search queries, including “napster mp3” and “napster download,” 
among others.76  
Third, LW optimized the software client’s features to enable 
third-party copyright infringement. Similar to Fung, LW created 
search functionality that allowed users to browse by genre, including 
“Classic Rock” and “Top 40.”77 LW employees tested the search 
functionality of the LW client using Sinead O’Connor’s copyrighted 
song “Nothing Compares 2 U,” and actively assisted users who 
requested technical assistance with the LW client’s functionality.78 
Fourth, LW depended on infringing use for commercial success.79 
LW’s software client was widely available online for free download, 
and LW depended on the selling of advertising, thereby tying revenue 
to the size of its user base.80 The free LW client also served as a 
platform to introduce users to LW’s other offerings, including LW 
Pro, a premium service, and the LW online store. The court 
concluded that LW’s “commercial success . . . is derived largely from 
the high-volume use of LW, most of which is infringing.”81 
Finally, LW failed to mitigate the infringing activities.82 
Numerous available technological barriers and design choices to 
                                                                                                             
73 Id. at *17, *20. 
74 Id. at *17.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at *17-18. 
77 Id. at *18.  
78 Id.  
79 Plaintiff’s expert conducted a random sample of 1,800 files requested for 
download for free distribution and found that 93% were protected by copyright or 
highly likely to be protected. Id. at *3. 
80 Id. at *19.  
81 Id.  
82 Id. at *20. 
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reduce infringement could have been implemented, including: hash-
based filtering,83 acoustic fingerprinting,84 and user education.85 
Both the Fung and Lime Group courts looked at the technology 
and the behavior of the P2P to find evidence of intent to promote 
infringement. The Lime Group court also examined commercial 
factors. Both Fung and LW offered search and index functionality to 
their users, and both provided direct assistance and support. Grokster 
very clearly provides that to be liable for inducement, a P2P must 
have an intent to induce infringement, as well as a technology used to 
infringe. This contrasts with the decision in Sony,86 where there was 
no evidence of an actual intent to induce and the Court held that such 
an intent could not be induced from the technology itself unless there 
were no substantial non-infringing uses. Grokster established that the 
provider of a technology used to infringe can be liable even if that 
technology has substantial non-infringing uses (does not meet the 
Sony standard) where evidence of intent to induce infringement can 
actually be shown. In Grokster, Fung, and Lime Group, the courts 
looked to the totality of the evidence to find an intent to induce.  
 
C.  Perfect 10 v. RapidShare: Technological-Behavioral Standard 
 
RapidShare is a file-hosting program that allows users to store 
files on its servers and to “share” the URLs for files so stored, rather 
than a P2P service.87 RapidShare’s servers “automatically generate a 
                                                                                                             
83 Hash-based filtering “utilizes a digital file’s ‘hash,’ which is a numeric 
representation of a file based on a complex algorithm, to identify and block 
infringing files.” Id. at *30 n.28.  
84 Acoustic fingerprinting “can monitor the uploading or downloading of 
digital files. . . . If the acoustic fingerprint of a particular file matches a copyright-
protected files present in the existing database, the transfer of that file may be 
blocked.” Id. at *30 n.30.  
85 Id. at *20.  
86 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 
(1984) (“Sony certainly does not ‘intentionally [induce]’ its customers to make 
infringing uses of respondents' copyrights, nor does it supply its products to 
identified individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of 
respondents' copyrights”) (citing Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 885 
(1982)). 
87 Perfect 10, Inc. v. RapidShare, No. 09-CV-2596 H, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 18, 
2010). 
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unique download link (a URL) for each uploaded file and send that 
link to the user who uploaded the file.”88 The file itself remains on 
RapidShare’s servers, but once the user receives the link, “she can 
email the link to friends, post it on her Web site for others to access, 
or keep it confidential, among other potential uses.”89 Perfect 10 
(P10), whose business involves the creation and sale of adult 
entertainment photos, videos, and other media, claimed direct 
infringement by third parties, that P10 owned the copyrights to some 
of the works at issue, and that those works were available for 
download from RapidShare’s servers.90  
The court’s order denied P10’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction, finding that P10 did not meets its burden for showing a 
likelihood of success on the merits.91 The court observed how 
RapidShare’s website “did not index user materials and did not allow 
users to search for specific files.”92 Comparing RapidShare’s 
contribution to infringement to prior cases finding liability, the court 
noted that “the public cannot enter rapidshare.com and browse 
through a catalog for desired materials,” nor could a RapidShare user 
“find a specific song from a peer’s library because RapidShare does 
not index its files.”93 The RapidShare service as a means of sharing 
files was headless, as “all communication regarding the location of 
files [was] user driven.”94 RapidShare did not provide an “integrated 
service” allowing for search and download that might be used to 
impute intent on the part of RapidShare.95 
Furthermore, from a behavioral standpoint, RapidShare took 
measures to prevent further damage to the copyright owners by 
locating and removing infringing materials.96 “[T]here [were] 
substantial lawful uses” of RapidShare’s servers, which “provided 
users with a secure location to store and access files from anywhere 
                                                                                                             
88 Id. at *2-3.  
89 Id. at *3.  
90 Id. at *8. 
91 Id. at *4, *11. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at *6.  
94 Id. at *8. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at *9 
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that there is Internet access.”97 In other words, RapidShare’s server 
was essentially an unfiltered repository because it had no itemized 
and searchable index.98 This technology did not expose RapidShare 
to inducement liability because there was no evidence of intent to 
induce infringement and RapidShare has many legitimate uses. 
RapidShare simply unlocked the online storage space for individual 
users to upload and store files. There was no advertising targeted to 
known infringers, no indexing, and no ability to search for files.99  
Here again, the court’s emphasis on search and indexing 
capability was an important factor in the contributory liability 
analysis under the Napster “site and facilities” framework.100  
 
IV. SYNTHESIS: NO SUCH THING AS HEADLESS 
 
Fung’s provision of search and index functionality in his software 
client and his administration of his websites and forums provided a 
head that affirmatively invited infringing use of available copyrighted 
material by third parties. LW created search and index capability and 
was not only aware of infringement but designed a business model 
around it, relying on infringing use to gain commercial success. In 
contrast, RapidShare housed potentially infringing content on its own 
servers but provided no search or index capability, did not actively 
encourage any third-party file-sharing through its software or server, 
and deleted infringing material upon receipt of a DMCA notice from 
copyright holders. RapidShare, in essence, was a disconnected 
                                                                                                             
97 Id. at *11.  
98 There are, however, dozens if not hundreds of external services that provide 
indexing for RapidShare.  
99 The YouTube court’s discussion of Grokster is telling: “The Grokster model 
does not comport with that of a service provider who furnishes a platform on which 
its users post and access all sorts of materials as they wish, while the provider is 
unaware of its content . . . and removes identified material when [it] learns [the 
content] infringes.” Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). The court also noted that an email from the plaintiff saying “the 
difference between YouTube’s behavior and Grokster’s is staggering.” Id. Both of 
these observations seem to apply to RapidShare, in contradistinction to Fung and 
Lime Group.  
100 RapidShare, No. 09-CV-2596 H, at *8 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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storage depot.  
What these three cases have in common is the courts’ emphasis 
on the provision of search and indexing functionality, presumably on 
the theory that if a service does not provide users with a means to 
locate infringing material, as well as upload it, the service must not 
have been designed specifically to promote illegal file sharing. As 
directed by Grokster, each of the three courts looked toward actions 
and behavior of the P2P for evidence of intent to foster infringement, 
analyzing whether the provision of the technology, joined with such 
behavior, could be analogized to sending inducing messages to 
encourage the infringement. Even where the court found that 
RapidShare’s storage technology was not designed to facilitate third-
party infringement, the court still examined RapidShare’s behavioral 
response. The RapidShare service allowed users to upload infringing 
files (it did not filter the files), but did not index the files, nor allow 
users to search for files. Although third parties found ways to use the 
RapidShare e-mailed hyperlinks to infringe, the court weighed 
RapidShare’s behavior, especially its active removal of P10’s 
copyrighted files, in RapidShare’s favor.  
Under the technological-behavioral standard applied by the 
courts, a head is still necessary, to respond to third-party infringement 
and reduce the P2P’s potential exposure to secondary liability.101  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the evolution of decentralized file-sharing technologies, 
the Fung court construed search and indexing functionality as the 
equivalent of sending a message encouraging third-party users to 
infringe (along with Fung’s literal inducement through his words and 
actions). As demonstrated by the extensive list of behavioral and 
business factors in Lime Group, courts will look at the totality of the 
                                                                                                             
101 This duty to respond should not be construed as a duty to monitor: the 
“DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright 
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately 
documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright. We decline to 
shift a substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider . . . .” Viacom 
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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defendant’s actions. Ultimately, the courts in Fung and Lime Group 
determined that search and indexing capability, along with 
affirmative marketing, profit from infringement, and user support 
features, created a “head” that sent an inducing message to third-party 
users to infringe. The RapidShare court tacitly acknowledged that a 
head can never truly be absent: RapidShare’s removal of the 
infringing files, once receiving notice of third-party infringement, 
reduced potential liability. Though inducement liability under 
Grokster technically requires more than just knowledge of 
infringement or potential for infringement, RapidShare suggests a 
higher level of care once P2Ps are notified of copyright 
infringement.102 A P2P can never completely remove itself from the 
file-sharing process; remedying specific known illegal uses may 
counteract allegations of inducing message through silence. The idea 
of an evolved, headless P2P, immune from secondary liability for the 
infringement of its users, is a fiction that has not survived judicial 
scrutiny. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Inducement liability under Grokster may be found where the 
defendant encourages infringement through the provision of 
search and indexing technology that provides access to infringing 
material, as well as through other behavioral factors indicating an 
intent to induce infringement. 
 Providing search and index capacity that facilitates finding and 
access to infringing materials may be treated as significant 
evidence of intent to induce; however, purely behavioral factors 
                                                                                                             
102 An interesting question is when knowledge becomes intent – if RapidShare 
did not specifically design the service to be infringing but third parties started using 
it that way, and RapidShare knew of that use and also realized it benefited from the 
infringement but did not take simple measures to discourage it, should RapidShare 
be liable, as raised by Mary Rasenberger. This is essentially the focus of Viacom 
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). While the service 
apparently was not originally designed to facilitate infringement, the founders 
intentionally kept infringing content up (even specific infringing content that they 
had identified) because they realized the infringing content was driving traffic to 
the YouTube site and increasing its value. 
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will also affect a court's determination of inducement. 
 Even if valid potential uses for the technology exist, P2Ps should 
still take affirmative steps to mitigate illegal infringement, 
including removing infringing files about which they have been 
notified.  
 A possible DMCA affirmative defense exists for websites with 
search and index functionality, provided the P2P meets the 
requirements set out in the safe harbor provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 
512. 
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